![]() New York: Oxford University Press.Įpicurus 1994. In Consciousness in Contemporary Science, ed. New York: New York University Press.ĭennett, D. Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107: 23–44.ĭarwin, C. The Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3): 586–604.īradley, B. New York: Oxford University Press.īradford, G. ![]() An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5: 119–133.īentham, J. How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. New York: Oxford University Press.Īydede, M. Bloomfield ( 2014, 2017) has argued against the distinction between moral and prudential values.Īnnas, J. Arguing directly against this claim would take us too far from our topic, and it is not a claim that is typically embraced by those who claim that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable. We should note that Sen’s example was constructed to argue against there being an “all things considered” point of view that reconciles the differences between moral and prudential value. Again: intrinsically good things are not supposed to make a situation worse that is the point of the generic Platonic/Kantian conception of intrinsic value with which we begin Section III. To attend to one option, consider bad pleasures, like that of the assassin, which would be intrinsically good for the assassin as it makes her happy, but it would nevertheless contribute to making the situation worse. Sen’s example could also be read as saying that a single pain could have both instrumental value or disvalue and intrinsic disvalue or value. The worry is that without reification, the only alternative is to say that when we want something “for its own sake” we are saying that we want it for no reason at all. Saying that a pleasure is something we can desire “for its own sake” is better, as long as it does not covertly imply the reification of sakes, though it may. Rather, we want to say that the ache is part of the sensation - it partly constitutes the sensation, as my hand partly constitutes my body. The ache contributes disvalue to the sensation, but it is not instrumental to it nor does it seem right to say that it is intrinsic to the sensation. Take the pain involved in an injury, say a cracked rib, and let’s assume the entire sensation can be broken up, to keep it simple, into the acute pain in the rib and the black and blue ache of the surrounding area. “Constitutive value” marks the presence of the part/whole relation, which is distinct from intrinsic value. Bradford ( 2020) uses the term “non-instrumental” in place of “intrinsic”, but this causes terminological problems: replacing the latter with the former leads to a conflation of intrinsic value and constitutive value.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |